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I.  INTRODUCTIION 
Until the mid-1970s, governments all over the world (especially in the 
developing economies), intervened in markets on the pretext of market failure arising 
from externalities, decreasing cost industries, and equity considerations for 
maximising social welfare. In Pakistan, where the private sector has played a 
dominant role, except probably for the 1970s,
1 private sector activities have all along 
been regulated through various types of controls and regulations on entry and exit, 
prices, credit, foreign exchange, imports, investments, etc. These regulations were 
imposed with a view to ensuring that private sector allocations were in accordance 
with the national priorities [see Pakistan (1983-84)]. However, the objectives were 
rarely realised and, in fact, these regulations have been responsible for red-tapism 
and corruption. 
On the grounds of government failure, privatisation and deregulation policies 
are being practised almost everywhere in the hope that they would help in efficient 
allocation of resources and higher levels of productivity. Considerable regulatory 
reforms have also been effected in Pakistan over the last two decades. Investment 
and import licensing have been withdrawn, most of the foreign exchange restrictions 
have been removed, capital market regulations have been simplified, price controls 
have been lifted, and interest rates have been deregulated. However, there is 
considerable room for further regulatory reforms. Similarly, various public 
enterprises in the manufacturing and financial sectors have been privatised, 
telecommunication, airlines, and energy firms have been partially divested, and the 
government has an ambitious privatisation programme of divestiture in various other 
fields. The main force behind the process of privatisation is the need to address the 
problems of mismanagement of resources, overstaffing, inappropriate and costly 
investments, poor quality of services, and heavy losses of various public enterprises.  
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1Banks, insurance companies, chemicals, light and heavy engineering, petro-chemicals, petroleum 
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afterwards was the private sector allowed to invest in these industries. A. R. Kemal  320
Privatisation policy is pursued in the hope that it will help in improving the 
levels of efficiency. However, experience with privatisation in Pakistan and 
elsewhere has been mixed [for example, see Kagami (1999) and Kemal (1996, 
1999)]. While privatisation and deregulation in several advanced countries has 
brought down costs and improved services, the experience of many developing 
countries shows that the efficiency levels did not improve after divestiture where 
private sector indulged in monopolistic practices.  In Pakistan, privatisation of the 
banking sector seems to be a big success, but in most of the manufacturing 
industries the formation of cartels has led to higher prices by restricting output 
levels.  
Privatisation in a competitive framework generally results in higher efficiency 
levels, but in the case of unregulated natural monopolies it is not necessarily so. 
However, if such industries are properly and effectively regulated, they would also 
show higher efficiency levels. Unfortunately, in the developing countries legislation 
relating to competition is either non-existent and/or the rules and guidelines for 
competition are implemented poorly. It needs to be underscored that access to 
information is the key factor for better regulation, but that is rather poor in 
developing countries.  
 
II.  RATIONALE FOR REGULATION 
Governments have long used economic, social, and administrative regulations 
to better align public and private interests, and the two most common arguments for 
the regulatory intervention are market failure and equity considerations.  If the 
economies of scale exist in an activity, a single firm would be able to meet the entire 
demand at the lowest cost, but in that case the monopolistic power of the firm will 
have to be restrained through regulation to ensure potential improvement in 
production efficiency.
2 Besides these, various regulations directly impact the market 
decisions such as pricing, competition, market entry or exit.  
It is obvious that only if the regulations are effectively implemented will the 
intended policy objectives be realised. However, in most of the countries, the results 
of regulation have been quite disappointing. Interestingly, regulatory failures tend to 
result in even more regulation and very rarely the underlying reasons for failure are 
assessed. Failure may arise due to various factors.
3 First, economic regulation 
requires information on the cost and demand structure of an industry, to which the 
regulators typically do not have any access. Second, producers find it very difficult 
to comply with the rules which are quite complex and technical. Moreover, the 
actions to improve compliance have been uncoordinated and asystematic. Third, 
regulations are sometimes used to influence private gains rather than to correct 
 
2The arguments of natural monopoly have been diluted over the last few years because of 
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market failure. The regulatory instruments such as quotas, licences, and subsidies 
have been used in Pakistan, and elsewhere, to channel significant amount of wealth 
to influential groups in the society. 
It is therefore quite clear that there is a real risk that regulations may 
become an obstacle to achieving the very economic and social well-being for 
which they are intended. Accordingly, any such regulation that creates 
unnecessary barriers to trade, investment, and economic efficiency or protects 
vested interests that seek protection from competition must be withdrawn. The 
hidden costs of inefficient regulation are so high that failure to reform can place 
the entire economy at great disadvantage, requiring protectionist policies, heavy 
subsidies, and other forms of support. 
Liberalising trade, encouraging competition, and reforming government 
institutions are mutually supportive.  Stable macroeconomic policy, flexible labour 
markets, appropriate regulation of capital markets, and complementary structural 
reforms provide a supportive environment that facilitates adjustments flowing from 
the regulatory reform.
4  It is quite obvious that in case of natural monopolies, 
injection of more competition by introduction of additional firms into market would 
be counter-productive. In such activities, regulations may be necessary to curb the 
monopolistic exploitation. However, close regulation of investment and other 
decisions of the firms may leave very little room for improving the levels of 
efficiency. As has rightly been argued by Baumol (1996), regulation may be 
detrimental to growth of productivity unless regulation is efficient; if the regulators 
pursue inconsistent policies, the producers would be unable to take decisions in 
accordance with the market conditions in time.  
While the transparency of regulatory process is essential, it must promote 
efficiency. If the regulation is done through accounting conventions such as cost-plus 
formula or the guaranteed rates of return, there will hardly be any incentives for 
reducing the cost of production. There has been considerable debate over the use of 
prices and output as instruments of control. Weitzman (1974) points out that the 
preferred policy instrument depends on the relative steepness of the marginal benefit 
and cost curves.  Chen (1990) argues that uncertainty at the decision stage breaks down 
the equivalence of price and quantity as instruments of control. Fraja and Iossa (1998) 
believe that “break-down is due to the presence of both asymmetry of information and 
the competitive fringe: without either of them price and quantity regulation are 
 
4The major benefits of regulatory reforms include boosting consumer benefits by reducing prices for 
services and products such as electricity, transport, and health care, and by increasing choice and service quality; 
reducing the cost structure of exporting and upstream sectors to improve competitiveness; and addressing a lack 
of flexibility and innovation in the supply-side of the economy, thereby reducing national vulnerability to 
economic shocks. At the same time, concerns about costs to workers in restructuring sectors, the quality of new 
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equivalent”. While it is possible to devise a regulatory mechanism such as a price cap, 
yielding both lower prices and stronger incentives for cost reduction, Fraja and Iossa 
also suggest that by setting the ‘output floor’, regulators make sure that there are 
improvements in the efficiency levels and these are shared between the firms and the 
consumers—rather than all of these accruing to the firm only. 
Stigler (1971) points out that the regulatory capture would shape policy 
outcomes depending on how the interest groups’ influence evolves over time and the 
regulatory institutions are able to ward off their influence. The regulatory 
commissions all over the world go through a life-cycle starting out as vigorous, 
imaginative, and enthusiastic protagonists of the public interest, but over time they 
gradually become devitalised with limited perspective, indulge in routine and 
bureaucratic policies and procedures, and increasingly become protective of the 
interests of the companies they are supposed to regulate. The influence of interest 
groups increases over time, collusions are formed, and they are quite costly to the 
society. [see Lierson (1949); Bernstein (1955); Huntington (1966); Downs (1967) 
and Olson (1982)]. Because of the close relationship with industry, the regulators get 
information which can be socially useful, but the regulators tend to use this 
information and discretionary powers to get bribes or future job opportunities in the 
industry [Laffont and Tirole (1993)].  
To the extent effective regulation improves the prospects for competitive 
outcomes, it reduces overall rents that can be appropriated by a private investor. An 
analysis of the regulation of entry in 85 countries shows that heavier regulation of 
entry is generally associated with greater corruption and a large unofficial economy, 
but not with better quality of private or public goods. It is also found that the 
countries with less democratic, and more interventionist, governments regulate entry 
more heavily. This evidence is difficult to reconcile with public interest theories of 
regulation but supports the public choice approach, emphasising rent extraction by 
those who could influence. [For example, see McChesney (1987) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993)].   
Obviously if regulations become inefficient, they should either be lifted or 
reformed so that the intended objectives are realised. The reform must aim at 
designing regulatory and other instruments, such as market incentives and goal-based 
approaches that are more flexible, simpler, and effective at lower cost. Since 
administrative regulations, through which governments collect information and 
intervene, have substantial impact on private sector performance, reforms must aim 
at eliminating regulations that are no longer required, streamlining and simplifying 
those that are needed, and improving the transparency of application. Regulatory 
reform that enhances competition and reduces regulatory costs can boost efficiency, 
reduce prices, stimulate innovation, and improve the ability of economies to adapt to 
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III.  CHANGING ROLES OF GOVERNMENT AND  
REGULATORY REFORMS IN PAKISTAN 
On the assumption that markets are not always perfect and the consumer 
needs to be protected against monopolistic exploitation—and that governments have 
political goals that market must serve, public intervention has remained the rule in 
Pakistan. However, not only the intended objectives of regulations were never 
realised, it led to delays in implementation of decisions. Distorted prices, lack of 
competition, and poor government management of businesses have hindered 
economic development, and have introduced inefficiencies in the economies of 
developing countries.  It needs to be noted that a successful private enterprise 
economy is a central building block of a successful and sustained anti-poverty policy 
[see Cook (2001)].  In the case of natural monopolies, regulation in the form of 
setting of prices, profits, and quality standards is necessary.
5  
The prerequisites for efficient and effective regulations are government’s 
willingness to establish the regulatory rules and allow regulators to operate with high 
degree of autonomy within the rules. A stable economic environment which does not 
allow changes in rules, and a political system with checks and balances to avoid any 
abrupt policy change, goes a long way in achieving the intended objectives. The 
institutions established for regulatory functions must have proper systems of 
accountability, transparency, targeting, and consistency. High risks associated with 
the process of regulation arise from uncertainties associated with the nature of rules, 
information asymmetries, and implementation lapses. 
Now we examine the regulatory reforms carried out over the last decade and 
also the regulatory authorities that have been established. 
 
Manufacturing Industries 
In the manufacturing sector, government interventions have taken three forms: 
first, controls on prices, investments, and imports with a view to regulating the level 
and pattern of investment; second, government influence on the profitability of 
different production activities through protection against imports, export subsidies, 
and fiscal incentives; third, direct government intervention in the production process 
through investments and nationalisation.  
Private investment was regulated through investment licensing until the 1980s 
with a view to ensuring optimal utilisation of resources. But the process was lengthy 
and the feasibilities of projects were so fabricated that the proposals were always 
accepted. It served no purpose but delayed the implementation of investments. 
Accordingly, the investment licensing requirements were gradually withdrawn and at 
 
5As pointed out by Parker (2001), there are three stages of regulation associated with the 
development of natural monopoly, viz., regulating the monopoly right after privatisation; promoting and 
policing competition; and maintaining that competition through effective national competition laws. A. R. Kemal  324
present neither the indigenous nor foreign investors are required to seek prior 
approval for setting up any industry. Nevertheless, there are still some irritants in the 
way of private sector as was noted by the Finance Minister in his budget speech and 
the government is implementing recommendations of a de-regulation committee for 
this purpose. An effective one-window facility would be rather helpful in this regard.  
The government has been encouraging the manufacturing sector through 
import policy, tariffs, and subsidies. High effective protection rates, levying export 
duties on inputs used in various industries, fiscal incentives such as tax holidays, tax 
credits, accelerated depreciation allowances and export subsidy and preferential 
export financing resulted in sharp growth of the industries. However, as a number of 
studies [Lewis and Guisinger (1968), Naqvi and Kemal (1991), Kemal, Mahmood 
and Ahmad (1994)] show, the real contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP 
has been fractional. Over the last two decades imports have been liberalised, tariffs 
have been rationalised, and the system to provide favours to the industries and firms 
through SROs has been discontinued. The rationalisation is expected to result in 
higher efficiency levels and allocation of resources in accordance with comparative 
advantage. The 1997 Industrial Policy spells out quite clearly the various types of 
fiscal incentives, including the initial depreciation allowances and the duty on 
imported machinery for different types of industries.  Since protection is the main 
source of enhancing profitability, it is not quite clear if the protection and fiscal 
incentives mutually reinforce each other or work in opposite directions. 
The government of Pakistan has been directly intervening in the 
manufacturing sector. It established PIDC in 1958, which set up the industries and 
divested the profitable ones. However, in 1972, various industries including 
chemicals, fertilisers, automobiles, cement, and petroleum refining were 
nationalised. Subsequently in 1974, vegetable ghee mills, and in 1976 rice milling, 
flour milling, and cotton ginning were also nationalised. Throughout 1970s, heavy 
amount of public investment flowed into the manufacturing sector. Since quite a few 
of these industries were making losses, and efficiency was low, most of the 
manufacturing public enterprises have been divested.   
The government also instituted a system of price controls.  The Price Control 
and Prevention of Profiteering and Hoarding Act, 1977 was introduced and the 
Office of the Controller General of Prices (CGP) was established in the Ministry of 
Industries. It allowed the government to fix maximum prices of essential products. 
This system acted as an impediment in the way of investment, but at present that 
office has been closed. While the market mechanism is allowed to clear the market, 
the government is expected to intervene to stop monopolistic exploitation. The 
government is expected to increase the supplies by reducing import duties. Even 
though the Monopoly Control Authority (MCA) was established in 1971, it has 
seldom been able to use its influence to protect the consumers. MCA, which used to 
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regulatory authority to check undue concentration of economic powers, monopoly 
power, and restrictive trade practices. 
 
State Bank of Pakistan 
The State Bank is an autonomous organisation and is the custodian of all the 
financial matters. It is responsible for smooth functioning of money and exchange 
markets and for monitoring of the banks and other financial institutions.  
 
Exchange Control System  
Exchange controls have remained in operation ever since the Rupee was 
overvalued in 1952. These regulated the inflow and outflow of foreign exchange 
resources to ensure that foreign exchange payments did not exceed the foreign 
exchange receipts. Under the system, the exporters deposited their foreign exchange 
earnings with the State Bank of Pakistan, which regulated its expenditure according 
to its foreign exchange budget. It took into consideration expected receipts through 
exports and foreign assistance and then made allocations to private and public 
sectors through import licenses issued to commercial and industrial users by the 
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (CCI&E). The Exchange Control System 
was made up of an elaborate licensing procedure, where the ceilings were fixed for 
the import of each product. Three types of import licenses were issued—commercial, 
industrial, and investment. The government relied on licensing rather than tariffs to 
restrict imports, due to unstable prices, unavailability of accurate projections of 
demand and supply of foreign exchange, and an insufficient level of foreign 
exchange reserves. 
Major changes have been effected in foreign exchange control in the recent 
past. Resident Pakistanis, including firms and companies, are allowed to maintain 
foreign currency accounts in Pakistan and they are allowed to open accounts outside 
the country as well. Restrictions on holdings of foreign currency and on the foreign 
exchange allowances for travel have also been removed. The rules governing private 
sector’s foreign borrowing have also been greatly liberalised, especially where no 
government guarantee is required.
6 Authorised Dealers have been allowed to import 
and export foreign currency notes and coins, either to replenish their stock of foreign 
currency notes or to dispose of surplus holdings of foreign currency notes, without 
prior approval of the State Bank. Pakistani currency is convertible at the current 
account and Pakistani rupee is on a free float. Nevertheless, State Bank of Pakistan 
intervenes in the market to stabilise the exchange rate. 
 
6A host of other restrictions on foreign payments have been removed, e.g., for foreign 
advertisements, education, membership of professional institutions, non-resident journalists’ fees, posting 
of newspaper correspondents abroad, publications, trade fairs and exhibitions, and excess baggage on 
foreign airlines. The non-residents can also invest in the government securities, including NIT Units, on 
repatriable basis. A. R. Kemal  326
Credit Flows 
With a view to ensuring that monetary and credit expansion is in safe limits, 
State Bank used to prepare and implement a credit plan through administrative 
measures. The plan outlined the credit limits on various financial institutions, 
distribution of credit to private and public sectors, and mandatory credit targets for 
priority sectors in line with national priorities.   
Until the reforms were introduced in early 1990s, maximum and minimum 
interest rates on deposits and advances were set by the State Bank. Similarly, the 
banks were obliged to buy the treasury bills at the low rate of 6 percent. 
However, with deregulation, these are the individual banks that decide the rate of 
interest on deposits and advances. State Bank influences the money supply and 
interest rates through market mechanisms such as discounts rates, open market 
operations, and the liquidity requirements.   
The financial sector has been deregulated but the State Bank has strengthened 
its monitoring and surveillance capacity.  The new guidelines to the banking sector 
include more strict limits on credit concentration and on conditional liabilities; rigid 
guidelines on the separation of bank ownership and management; tighter margin 
requirements on equity-based advances; and a strong system of classification and 
provisioning for non-performing assets.   
 
Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP)
7  
The Commission, established in 1997 as an independent regulatory body, is 
responsible for regulating the securities and any businesses in stock exchange or in 
other security markets; supervising and monitoring the activities of any central 
depository and stock exchange clearing house; registering and regulating the 
working of stock brokers, share transfer agents, portfolio managers, investment 
advisers or any one associated with security markets; registering and regulating the 
investment schemes; regulation of securities industry and related organisations like 
leasing companies and financial institutions; protecting the market from unfair 
practices; promoting investors’ education and intermediary training; conducting 
audit of Stock Exchanges and other intermediary organisations; encouraging the 
development of capital market and corporate sector in Pakistan; regulating 
acquisition of shares and the merger and takeover of companies; and suggesting 
reforms in the rules and regulation of companies.  
The Commission aims at increasing the demand and supply of capital for 
promoting investment, expanding industrial output, and generating employment 
opportunities. After the stock market crisis in May 2000, the Commission took 
various measures to restore investors’ confidence and to achieve a fair, transparent, 
 
7Before the establishment of SECP (2001) Corporate Law Authority (CLA) attached to Ministry 
of Industries had been administering the corporate laws since 1981. Regulatory Framework in Pakistan  327
and efficient stock market.
8 The Commission has also implemented various 
regulatory reforms including the issuance of the Brokers and Agents Registration 
Rules and the Insider Trading Guidelines. A major initiative is underway to develop 
the mutual funds/pension funds to give the market an institutional foundation. Also 
regulations have been made more flexible to allow floatation of sector-specific funds 
to cater to different investor preferences, and investment guidelines have been made 
less restrictive.  Futures Contracts Market and National Clearing and Settlement 
System have also been established. 
 
Transport and Communications 
Except for the road transport, all other sectors such as telecommunication, 
railways, shipping, and aviation have been in the public sector. However, government 
intends to privatise the Pakistan Telecommunication and recently its monopoly has 
been abolished. Two authorities, viz., Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) 
and Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) have been established 
to ensure the quality of telecommunication services at reasonable and fair prices.  
 
Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) 
PTA is a regulatory body for the telecom sector in Pakistan and has been 
established under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organisation) Act 1996. It 
covers fixed-line telephony, mobile telephone, wireless communication, satellite 
consumer, Internet, AudioNet, Paging Service, Voice Mail, and Digital Radio 
Paging. It has been formed to ensure and facilitate the availability of high quality, 
efficient, cost-effective, and competitive telecommunication services throughout 
Pakistan and to protect the interests of consumers and licencees. Its main functions 
include: promoting competition among service providers; regulating the 
establishment, operation, and maintenance of telecom systems and services; issuing 
licences to telecommunication service providers and ensuring transparency and non-
disorientation in their issuance; protecting the rights of consumers as well as of the 
licencees; promoting modernisation and setting quality standards for various services 
in the sector; promoting Internet; managing radio frequency spectrum along with 
Frequency Allocation Board; taking notice of any complaints against the licencees; 
and ensuring transparency and non-discrimination in the issuance of such licences. 
The authority has taken various steps to modernise the system and increase the 
use of Internet. A number of data and Internet service providers are operating their 
 
8Some of the steps taken include implementation of the T+3 settlement system, substantial 
increase in net capital requirements, stipulation of capital adequacy requirements for brokers, 
strengthening of margin requirements, appointment of 40 percent independent directors on the boards of 
the stock exchanges, and initiation of actions to ensure the independence of the Commission’s Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO).  A. R. Kemal  328
services in the private sector under licence from PTA.  After getting the licence from 
PTA, a number of private operators have established telecom systems and operate 
their services through interconnect arrangements with PTCL. Mobile operators are 
issued notices to improve their services; otherwise they face penalties. Regarding 
tariffs, accounting rates for international telephone calls have continued to fall over 
the last couple of years. And to compensate for the impact of reduction in 
international settlement rates and in line with global trends, domestic tariffs have 
been rationalised.  
 
Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)  
PEMRA has been established under the PEMRA Ordinance, 2002.  PEMRA 
provides project management guidelines and action plans to the private sector 
interested in establishing radio, television, and Cable TV stations in the country. 
The main objectives of the authority include improvements in the standard of 
information, education, and entertainment; enlarging the choice available to the people 
of Pakistan in the media for news, current affairs, religious knowledge, art, culture, 
science, technology, economic development, social sector concerns, music, sports, 
drama and other subjects of public and national interest; facilitating the devolution of 
responsibility and power to the grassroots by improving the access of the people to 
mass media at the local and community level; and ensuring accountability, 
transparency, and good governance by optimising the free flow of information. 
 
Energy 
The energy sector has mostly been under the control of the government. The 
Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC) is responsible for all types of fuel 
supplies and this, together with Pakistan State Oil (PSO), is on the privatisation list. 
In the power sector, Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), and 
Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC), a corporate body under WAPDA’s 
control, are the two major suppliers of electricity. The government also intends to 
privatise the latter, and after corporatising it, it may divest the former as well. 
 
National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) 
WAPDA and KESC, the two power agencies, have suffered heavy losses and 
the need for restructuring of these two organisations was realised almost twenty 
years back. It was felt that expansion and efficiency of power generation and 
transmission capacity could not be achieved without the involvement of the private 
sector.  
In 1992, the government prepared the strategic plan for the privatisation of the 
power sector and also approved the creation of an autonomous regulatory agency to 
introduce transparent and judicious economic regulation to the power sector of Regulatory Framework in Pakistan  329
Pakistan.  NEPRA has been established as an independent regulatory body to 
improve the efficiency and availability of electric power services while protecting 
the interests of consumers, investors and the operators equally, and to promote 
competition and deregulate power sector activities where competition exists. Its 
major responsibilities include: issuing of licensing for generation, transmission and 
distribution of electric power; enforcement of quality standards and ensuring of 
safety in the operation and supply of electricity to consumers; determine tariffs for 
generation, transmission and distribution of electric power; and approving the 
investment and power acquisition programmes of the utility companies. 
There are various facets of power industry under the purview of NEPRA. One 
major issue has been the cross-subsidies and NEPRA has achieved some success, 
though a limited one, in reducing the cross-subsidy. Flat rates have been abolished 
and the rates for different consumers have been somewhat rationalised. Similarly, 
NEPRA has asked both WAPDA and KESC to reduce transmission losses and 
attempt other efficiency improvements to reduce the cost of production. Consumers 
have also been protected from frequent price variation by allowing only quarterly 
adjustment for fuel price adjustment.  
NEPRA has finalised the benchmarks for performance of the distribution 
companies. To maintain the environmental standards, all the generation companies 
granted licenses by NEPRA are required to maintain the environmental standards as 
may be prescribed by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency. But till now 
nothing substantial is evident except for the issuing of licensing to distribution and 
generation companies. 
 
Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA)  
OGRA was established in 2002 for the development of oil and gas sector 
enhancement, private sector investment, and protection of consumer interests. It 
regulates various activities including construction or operation of natural gas and oil 
pipelines and the testing facilities, starting facilities and natural gas installation; 
construction or operation of natural gas pipelines, testing facility, storage facility, 
and natural gas installation;  construction or operation of pipelines, testing facility, 
storage facility, and installation relating to LPG/LNG; construction or operation of 
oil refinery, oil pipelines testing facility, storage facility, blending facility, and oil-
related installation;  transmission, distribution, and sale of natural gas; transmission, 
filling, marketing, and distribution of LPG/LNG; marketing and storage of refined 
oil products. 
The Authority issues licences for regulated activities to ensure provision of 
open access, common carrier, and common operator—to promote effective 
competition and enforce better performance of service and safety standards. It also 
regulates tariffs by taking into account the rate of return, prudent operation and A. R. Kemal  330
maintenance cost, and other relevant factors which give a reasonable rate of return. It 
also determines gas well-head prices and ensures prudent cost-effectiveness and 
economic efficiency in the investment resources. 
 
IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Over the last two decade, Pakistan has significantly reformed its regulatory 
framework, though more needs to be done still. It has privatised a number of public 
enterprises and intends to privatise the remaining public enterprises including 
utilities, some of which may still be considered as natural monopolies. With minimal 
direct intervention of the government in the economy, there is a need to ensure that 
private sector allocation of resources is in accordance with the national priorities and 
that the monopolists do not indulge in fleecing the consumer. Accordingly, the 
incentive structure has to be reformed so that it promotes dynamic comparative 
advantage, ensuring consistency between the protection afforded and the fiscal 
incentives. Similarly, the regulatory authorities will have to be protected against the 
vested groups, and efficient outcomes ensured. 
Reforms in the financial sector have been rather significant. Autonomy of the 
State Bank has been the major achievement, and one hopes that the spread between 
deposit and interest rates would be narrowed down as a result of the guidelines 
provided by the State Bank to the financial institutions. The reforms in the exchange 
market have been substantial and the floatation of Pakistani rupee through active 
monitoring of the State Bank would ensure exchange rates in line with long-run 
equilibrium. Similarly, supervision by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
would be helpful in encouraging firms to go public, and give confidence to the 
investors.   
With a view to regulating utilities, various regulatory authorities have been set 
up. Since there is a cycle where the regulatory agencies over time degenerate into 
protecting the organisations which they are supposed to regulate, checks and 
balances must be put in place so that persons in responsible positions in these bodies 
are not corrupted. Moreover, these authorities must have the services of competent 
officers who are well-versed with the latest regulatory measures. Whereas in some of 
the authorities the regulators have obtained services of such persons, the others must 
make an effort towards recruiting them.  
It is important how the industries are regulated. Cost Plus Pricing was 
introduced in Pakistan and in 1980s it was discontinued.  Similarly, guaranteed rate of 
profits was also practised; when profits exceeded the specified limit, they were 
squeezed through surcharges, and when profits fell short of the limit they were 
subsidised. Because both of these systems resulted in inefficient outcomes, they were 
abandoned. Regulators may have to look for better alternatives including output floor. 
Let me end by saying that while there have been considerable regulatory 
reforms in Pakistan, the remaining irritants need to be removed on a priority basis. Regulatory Framework in Pakistan  331
Regulatory authorities have a very difficult task ahead. They must be given 
autonomy so that their decisions gain credibility; and checks and balances should be 
so formulated that they cannot indulge in corrupt practices. 
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